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J u r i s d i c t i o n is c o n f e r r e d un this C o u r t by U t a h C o d e A n n .
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i)
a

IQQ7.

( 1 9 9 6 ) . T h e final judgment w a s e n t e r e d on J a n u a r y

T h e Ni *

entry of t h e

judgment

- '*--

-s file-1 w i ' h i n thirty days of

.« - * ^~

therefore timely.

Utah k,

App„

the
P.

4(a).

ISSUES

PRESENTED

1.
W a s M r s . L i n d s a y o:

v

of t h e U t a h F o r e i g n J u d g e m e n t s A, i
fc

un

pa^d

Wa s

n

alimony under the foreign

M rs

I irnlsn y * i \

•-• j m p [ e #

s e e k i n g :»>

. - A ana

udgment

Decree?
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reference

a d d i t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s and s e g m e n t s o^ ^ h e f o r e i g n D e c r e e ,

to

the

without

filing or registering them, sufficient for her to "bootstrap" into
the portion of the Decree filed, such that the requirements of the
Utah Foreign Judgment Act could be deemed to have been met? And if
so, was it reversible error for the Trial Court to proceed to hear
the issues of alimony, where the foreign Decree (alimony) segments
were not properly filed under the requirements of the Act?

3.
Does the Statute of Limitations, as set forth in U.C.A. § 7812-29, apply to enforcement of obligations which were not reduced
to judgment at the time when the Foreign Decree was domesticated in
Utah? And if it does, does it apply where the unpaid alimony sums
accrued prior to the registration in Utah apply only a "liability"
at the time of registration, such that the judicial enforcement is
barred by the effect of the applicable Statute of Limitations?

4.
Did the Trial Court commit reversible error in refusing to
a

PPly (to the past alimony obligations, in this case) the Statute

of Limitations provisions as set forth in U.C.A. § 78-12-29, and in
so doing, allowing Mrs. Lindsay to seek relief for an obligation
not reduced to judgment before the tolling of the statute?

5.
Did the Court err in awarding attorney's fees to Mrs. Lindsay,
without making specific findings as to the parties' relative needs
and abilities, or some bad faith?

6.
Could the Trial Court award attorney's fees to Mrs. Lindsay if
it did not first have proper

jurisdiction on the underlying

(alimony) issues?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CODE

Appellant asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l through 9,
Utah Foreign Judgments Act and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29 (1996) (as
to the Statute of Limitations) are both specifically applicable to
this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final order
of the Fourth District Court, in and for Utah County, issued by
Judge Howard Maetani, in regard to a Petition for Modification and
enforcement of a Foreign Decree.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The parties
obtained a Decree of Dissolution from the Superior Court, State of
Washington, King County, on or about June 13, 1991. Mrs. Lindsay
subsequently moved to the state of Utah and Mr. Lindsay moved to
the state of California (he has never lived in Utah). On or about
October 18, 1994, Defendant/Appellant registered (pursuant to the
Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-l(1953)) in the Fourth
District

Court

for

the

State
3

of

Utah,

Provo,

a

certified/exemplified copy of the foreign judgment entitled "Decree
of Dissolution" (which had three separate segments), but only
registered the first segment, entitled "Permanent Parenting Plan".
On or about the first week of June, 1995, Mrs. Lindsay was
served with a Petition to Modify in the action now registered in
Utah, which Petition and registration addressed only the issues of
visitation, custody, transportation costs, and attorney's fees —
all covered by the one segment properly registered by the Defendant
in Utah.
Subsequently, Mrs. Lindsay, but the default was set aside. On
or about February 9, 1996, she filed a counter claim, without
complying with the specific filing requirements of the Utah Foreign
Judgments Act. On or about April 16, 1996, Mrs. Lindsay filed an
Amended Counterclaim (again without complying with the specific
requirements

of

the

Utah

Foreign

Judgments

Act), requesting

additional relief.
Mr. Noakes raised timely objections to the jurisdictional
issues (and statute of limitations). Denying these objections
wholesale, the Trial Court extended jurisdiction to consider the
issue of alimony.
A trial was held and at the conclusion of trial, a judgment
was entered against Mr. Noakes for alimony which accrued prior to
registration in Utah in the amount of $30,486.30, plus attorneys
fees and costs. The Trial court entered it's Memorandum Decision,
finding in favor of Mrs. Lindsay/Appellee

as to alimony and

attorney's fees, and the Court subsequently entered it's Findings
4

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
C. Statement of Facts.

The parties were married on May 9,

1975 in Los Angeles, California, and subsequently established
residency in Washington state.
The parties obtained a Decree of Dissolution from the Superior
Court, State of Washington, King County on or about June 13, 1991.
The Plaintiff subsequently moved to the state of Utah and the
Defendant moved to the state of California. Except for exercising
visitation with his daughter in the state of Utah, the Defendant
has had no connections or contacts with the state of Utah.
On

or

about

October

18,

1994,

Defendant/Appellant

registered (pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 7822a-l(1953)) in the Fourth District Court for the State of Utah,
Provo, a certified/exemplified
entitled

"Decree

of

copy

Dissolution"

of

(which

the
had

foreign

judgment

three

separate

segments), along with only the first segment, entitled "Permanent
Parenting Plan".
On or about the first week of June, 1995, Plaintiff was
served with a Petition to Modify in the action now registered in
Utah,

regarding

only

the

issues

of

visitation,

custody,

transportation costs, and attorney's fees — all covered by the one
segment properly registered by the Defendant in Utah.
Subsequently the Plaintiff defaulted, but the Default was
set aside.
On or about February 9, 1996, the Plaintiff filed a
Counter Claim (without complying with the specific requirements of
5

the Utah Foreign Judgments Act), where the requested relief was;
a. That the Judgment, Order and Decree entitled "Order on
Revision re Order on Reconsideration for Child Support", Superior
Court, State of Washington, King County, be adopted in the Fourth
District Court, State of Utah;
b. That she be awarded attorney/s fees"
On or about April 16, 1996, the Plaintiff filed an
Amended Counterclaim (again without complying with the specific
requirements of the Utah Foreign Judgments Act), and requested that
the orders out of the state of Washington with respect to custody,
visitation, child

support, alimony,

and property

division be

adopted under the Utah Foreign Judgments Act.
Pursuant to the parties' Washington Decree, the Defendant
was obligated to pay the following, as for maintenance;
$1,000.00 per month from 10-25-90 until August, 1992.
$800.00 per month from September 1, 1992, through September 1,
1993.
$1,050.00 per month due from September 1, 1993 until September
1, 1994.
$400.00 per month from September 1, 1994 until September 1,
1995.
The Plaintiff did not at any time file with the Utah
Trial Court (under the requirements of the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act) certified copies of the separate segment of the parties'
Decree that dealt with alimony.
Some of the disputed issues were resolved by stipulation.
6

The remaining unsettled issues (at the time of trial) were alimony
and visitation rights of the Defendant. The matter came on before
trial on October 1, 1996. Over the (jurisdictional and Statute of
Limitations) objections by the Plaintiff, the Court agreed to
consider the issue of alimony. The Court reserved the issue of
visitation until such time as the parties had completed mediation,
and, after taking evidence and testimony, issued a Ruling on the
remaining issue of alimony arrearages. The Trial Court found that
alimony was owing by Mr. Noakes, and subsequently entered an award
for alimony and judgment for alimony arrearages in the amount of
$30,486.30, plus attorneys fees and costs.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court erred in hearing and issuing Judgment on the issue
of alimony, because the issue was not properly before the Court,
having never been registered by either party as a foreign Decree.
The trial court should have applied the U.C.A. § 78-12-29, and
in fact could not have relied upon U.C.A. § 78-12-22 because there
was never a judgment for past due alimony from the state of
Washington.

The Trial Court's application of Utah's statues to

interpret, rewrite or alter a foreign Decree, and reaching back to
a time prior to when a foreign Decree is registered, is not
appropriate and should not have been done by the Utah trial Court.
Essentially,
retroactively

and

the

Trial

Court

applied

in a manner to alter
7

the

the

Utah

Code

foreign Decree:

specifically to establish that the pre-registration alimony becomes
a judgment upon the point at which it becomes due and owing, and
back to a point in time when Utah did not have jurisdiction over
the parties or the subject of alimony.

Such an application is a

violation of due process as well as the fact that it is not
authorized or justified by any application of any Utah Code or
better case law.
The award of attorneys fees was not justified by the Findings
of Fact or Conclusions of Law; and does not reflect the fact that
the Defendant prevailed on his Petition — rendered as it was, this
aspect of the Ruling appears to have been made under passion or
prejudice.

POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF WAS OBLIGATED TO FIRST COMPLY WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT
IN SEEKING REVIEW AND JUDGMENT
FOR UNPAID ALIMONY UNDER THE FOREIGN DECREE

Mrs. Lindsay failed to file the required affidavits and failed
to file a certified copy of the separate segment of the Dissolution
which dealt with the Separation and Property Agreement (alimony).
The only document properly filed and before the Court, was the
Decree of Dissolution

and the

single segment comprising

the

Parenting Plan, dealing with custody and visitation, which was
properly filed and registered by Defendant.
Although a copy of the Separation and Property Agreement was
provided to the Court and placed in the file, it was not actually
8

filed pursuant to the requirements set forth in the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act.
This issue is governed by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act,
U.C.A. § 78-22a-l through 3, which states in pertinent part:
(1), for the purpose of this chapter,
"foreign judgment" means any judgment,
decree or order of a court of the United
States or of any other court who's acts
are entitled to full faith and credit
in this state".
In addition U.C.A. § 78-22a-3 mandates that the counsel for
the registering party file a certified copy of the foreign document
and also

file an Affidavit with the clerk of court stating the

last known post-office address of the other party. The Counsel for
Plaintiff failed to comply with the proper procedures when he filed
both the Counterclaim and Amended Counterclaim —

without the

support of the Foreign Judgment Act, the claims fall short of
reaching the level of jurisdiction.
Having

not

been

properly

registered

and

supported

by

compliance with the provisions of the Act, the alimony segment was
not properly before the Court, and the Court erred in considering
and

then

awarding

judgment

for

the

unpaid

alimony.

Simply

presenting the document to the Court, does not comply with the very
specific procedural and notice provisions of the Utah Foreign
Judgments Act.
/
/
/
/

9

POINT II
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO PROCEED TO HEAR THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY
WHERE THE FOREIGN DECREE SEGMENTS APPLICABLE TO
ALIMONY HAD NOT BEEN PROPERTY FILED WITH THE COURT
The Plaintiff failed to file with the Court the required
affidavits and failed to file a certified copy of the separate
segment of Dissolution which dealt with the Separation and Property
Agreement (as to alimony).

The only document properly filed and

before the Court was the Decree of Dissolution and the single
segment comprising the Parenting Plan, dealing with custody and
visitation.
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution
provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
state

to

the

public

Acts,

Records,

and

judicial

Proceedings of every other State.
Created as a mechanism for enforcing this section, the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act, defines a "foreign judgment" as
any judgment, decree, or order of a court of
the United States or of any other court whose
acts are entitled to full faith and credit in
this

state." Utah

Code Ann.

§

78-22a-2(l)

(1992).

However, before the said judgment can be enforced in Utah, a party
must first file it with a clerk of any district court, pursuant to
the terms set forth in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-22a- 2(2) (1992).

It is only after the proper filing

occurs that the Act provides that;
10

the clerk of the district court shall treat the
foreign judgment in all respects as a judgment of
a district court of Utah," I£.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of this statute
is to enable "foreign judgments to be treated as if they were local
judgments once they have been [properly

registered

and] filed with

the clerk of a district court-" Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d
L142, 1144 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added).
The proper procedure must be followed prior to any party
having the ability to seek relief in the Court:
"The demands of due process rest on the concept
of basic fairness of procedure and demand a
procedure appropriate to the case and just to the
parties involved."
Wiscombe v. Wiscombe. 744 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting
Rupp v. Grantsville Cityr 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)).
In examining the necessity of properly following the terms of
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Court in
P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cited to

Holm v. Smilowitz. 840

"Comment at 33. Section 2

of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964" and
stated that it;
is substantially similar to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
Thus, enforcement of a foreign custody decree pursuant to the
UCCJA must be accomplished in compliance with provisions of
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, which governs the procedure for
enforcement of all foreign judgments. See, generally, Beck v.
Smith. 296 N.W.2d 886, 891 (N.D. 1980). This ruling is
consistent with other states that have held that under the
UCCJA, a certified copy of the foreign judgment must first be
filed in the state before the state will recognize and enforce
it. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pagan. 103 Or. App. 453, 798
11

P.2d 253, 255 (1990). Otherwise, nothing could prevent one
divorced parent from suddenly appearing on the former spouse's
doorstep with a foreign order in hand, demanding immediate
change of custody without the custodial parent having an
opportunity to be heard, or the foreign order tested for
validity. An order of a judge in one state is simply not
enforceable in another state until that order has been
domesticated in the second state.
Although in Holm the issue was custody and not alimony, the
discussion regarding the need to follow proper procedure is very
similar.

Applied in the Noakes case now before the Court, the

Court could logically conclude that unless the certified copy was
required to be properly filed with and recognized up by the Utah
Court, along with the Affidavit of the Attorney, nothing would
prevent a party from appearing essentially ex parte, and demanding
a judgment for tens of thousands of dollars which may or may not
have been available to that same party in the foreign state in
which the Decree was issued.
Nothing

prevented

Mrs.

Lindsay

from

taking

the

proper

procedural steps to obtain judicial review in Washington state, and
making application for a judgment in that state and then, if
entitled to and granted a judgment, then filing

it in Utah.

Nothing prevented Mrs. Lindsay from properly filing the applicable
section of the Decree she wished to have enforced
pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
/
/
/
/
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in Utah -

POINT III
THE STATUTE OJ* LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH IN
U.C.A. § 78-12-29 SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE,
TO THE REQUEST FOR A JUDGMENT FOR ALIMONY BECAUSE
THE ARREARAGES WERE ONLY A "LIABILITY11
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL
Even if Mrs. Lindsay had properly filed the Foreign Decree as to alimony, a judgment should not have been entered.
The U.C.A. § 78-12-29 requires that Plaintiff's action seeking
judgment via the enforcement of the Defendant's liability

on the

Decree of Divorce, should have been brought "WITHIN ONE YEAR [for]
(l)"An action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign
state".
The liability created by the parties' Washington Decree was as
follows;
$1,000.00 per month from 10-25-90 until August, 1992.
$800.00 per month from September 1, 1992 through September 1,
1993.
$1,050.00 per month due from September 1, 1993 until September
1, 1994.
$400.00 per month from September 1, 1994 until September 1,
1995.
Mrs. Lindsay's Counter Claim that requested relief was;
a. That the Judgment, Order and Decree entitled "Order on
Revision re Order on Reconsideration for Child Support", Superior
Court, State of Washington, King County be adopted in the Fourth
District Court, State of Utah;
b. That she be awarded attorney's fees.
Then on or about April 16, 1996, the Plaintiff filed an
Amended Counterclaim (again without complying with the specific
13

requirements of the Utah Foreign Judgments Act), and requested that
the orders out of the state of Washington with respect to custody,
visitation, child support, alimony, and property division be
adopted under the Utah Foreign Judgments Act.
The Defendant's alimony obligation to the Plaintiff ceased on
September 1, 1995 (and all arrears prior to February, 1992, were
eliminated by Order of 25 March, 1992). Because the Plaintiff
initiated (by unregistered counter claims) the action regarding
alimony on February 9, 1996, she is limited, if in fact entitled to
any relief, by the statute of limitations to recovery 12 months
prior to her initiation of the action, provided that she properly
plead and raised the issue of a judgment for arrearages. However,
Mrs. Lindsay has only requested that the court "adopt" the Foreign
Decree.
On April 16, 1996, Plaintiff simply requested that the entire
foreign Decree be "enforced", but still did not properly register
the segments, and did not ask for a specific judgment. Plaintiff
finally but for the first time formally requested a judgment at the
time of trial, (held October 1, 1996) — even were this last minute
pleading sufficient, she would still be

limited to one-year prior

to the October, 1996, request at trial.

In that case, the

Defendants alimony obligation/liability would have expired prior
to the Defendant's

request

for Judgment, as

it expired

(by

stipulation of the parties) September 1, 1995, a full year prior to
trial —

and the Statute ran out a month prior to late request at

trial.
14

There is ample case law which addresses the issue of statutes
of

limitations, and the choice

of which

state's

statute of

limitations should apply.
Pan Energy v Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, (Utah Supreme Court, May,
1991), addressed the issue of domestication of a foreign Judgment
(where the amount owing had already been rendered to judgment) and
the effect the domestication has upon the Judgment, which held:
The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court of
Utah. A judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect
and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or
staying, as a judgment of a district court of this state and
is subject to enforcement and satisfaction in like manner.
Therefore, even if the Mrs. Lindsay properly filed the Decree,
and could be said to have met the specific requirements of the
Foreign Judgment Act, by requesting in the Counterclaim (filed on
or about February 9, 1996), that the Washington Decree "be adopted"
by the Utah Court, the alimony segment of the Decree, remained an
"obligation" only, and had not been reduced to a Judgment in any
state.
In the Pan Energy case, cited above, the original Order (from
the state of Oklahoma), when rendered to Judgment by Utahr had
exceeded the statute of limitations in Oklahoma.

However, Utah's

statute of limitations was longer than that existing in Oklahoma.
The Supreme Court ruled that once a foreign judgment is filed with
Utah Court's, the laws of Utah applied and not the laws of
Oklahoma.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Pan Energy as follows:
15

The Utah Foreign Judgment Act provides a mechanism for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment in Utah. Utah Code Ann. §
78-22a-2(2) (1987) provides in part:
The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court of
Utah. A judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect
and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or
staying, as a judgment of a district court of this state and
is subject to enforcement and satisfaction in like manner.
(Emphasis added.) This statute requires foreign judgments to
be treated as if they were local judgments once they have been
filed with the clerk of a district court. Once filed, the
foreign judgment is subject to the same procedures to attack
or enforce it as a Utah judgment. Thus, because foreign
judgments properly filed in Utah essentially become Utah
judgments under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Utah
statute of limitations applies to the enforcement of those
judgments in Utah. ID.
In Pan Energy, the Supreme Court also referred to the case of
Stanford v. Utley. 341 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1965), as follows;
In Stanford, Judge (now Justice) Blackmun wrote: "We feel
that registration provides, so far as enforcement is
concerned, the equivalent of a new judgment of the
registration court." 341 F.2d at 268. Stanford was a diversity
case in which the court looked to the law of Missouri, the
state where the judgment had been registered, for the
applicable statute of limitations. Although the judgment was
unenforceable in Mississippi, the state where rendered, the
court allowed enforcement of the judgment because the Missouri
statute of limitations had not yet expired. 341 F.2d at 268.
In Pan Energy, the Utah Supreme Court also addressed the issue
of

the

theory

that

U.CA.

§

78-22a-8(1987), (Uniformity

of

Interpretation) raised by the defense, that Utah's method of
enforcement of a foreign judgment must be the same as the foreign
state's method, that is essentially that Utah must enforce the
statute's of the original state, when they held;
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act provides that it "shall be
construed to effectuate the general purpose to make uniform
the law of those states which enact it." Clearly, the Act does
16

not make foreign statutes applicable in Utah. Rather, its
policy is to provide a simple and uniform method for enforcing
foreign judgments in states that enact the Foreign Judgment
Act. The Utah Foreign Judgment Act simply requires that
foreign judgments filed in the state be treated the same as
local judgments in all respects, including the applicable
statute of limitations regarding enforcement.
While

in Pan Energy the

issue was clearly

"statute of

limitations", it is dicta that would guide the court in any issue
in dispute where the Utah Foreign Judgment Act is involved. In the
instant case, the issue is alimony, and therefore, as to the issue
of alimony, the Utah Court is bound by the application of the Utah
statute of limitations, as it applies in this case.
The Restatement of Conflicts Laws provides that "the local law
of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another
state is enforced" Restatement

(second) of Conflicts of Laws, §99,

1969.
The rational behind this section is described in comment a, b,
and c of § 99, which states:
a. Rational. The method by which a sister State judgment is to
be enforced are determined by local law of the forum, subject to
the qualification that they cannot be made so complex and expensive
as to make enforcement of a sister state judgment unduly difficult
(citing Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
Although the parties Decree of Divorce required Defendant to
pay alimony, even beyond the Plaintiff's remarriage, the Plaintiff
has

never

had

the

arrearages

reduced

to

Judgment, and

the

obligation of the Plaintiff to act on the Defendant's liability,
once registered as a foreign Decree in Utah, and to render it to
17

Judgment, had a one-year Utah statute of limitations to seek
Judgment for any claimed arrears.
Should the Utah court then choose to render any judgment
against the Defendant, he would then have the right to assert any
Utah defenses he may choose against the judgment

—

including the

application of the Statutes of Limitations, restricting the scope
of the Utah Court's reach, and the court's ability to render a
judgment.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION
AS SET FORTH IN U.C.A. § 78-12-29
The trial court cited two cases in justifying it's reliance
upon the avoidance of the Statutes applicable to foreign judgments
(one year statute), and in support of it's choice and application
and use of U.C.A.§ 78-12-22 (eight years statute of limitations).

The first case was Logan v. Schneider. 609 P. 2d 943 (Utah
1980).

The Logan case can be distinguished

situation.

from the Noakes

in Logan, the Plaintiff sought an order which would

require Defendant to pay child support. Later a child support order
was entered, in Ohio.
Later, (again in Ohio), the Plaintiff filed with the Ohio
court a motion claiming arrearages in child support payments in the
amount of $4,695, and the Ohio Court entered a judgment against
Defendant, granting plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $4,905.
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The Plaintiff then moved to Utah and sought enforcement of the
specific Ohio judgment against Defendant.
The Defendants claims in Logan was that the claim was new in
Utah and thus untimely.

However, the distinction between Noakes

and Logan) is both critical and clear.

In Logan the Utah Supreme

Court applied the applicable statute of

limitation

that was

effective in the state of Ohio, and because Ohio "courts have
explicitly held that in Ohio there is no statute which prescribes
that judgments or actions on judgments (including court-ordered
support payments) are subject to any limitation. ...The 1975 action
is therefore not barred." The Utah Supreme Court in Logan applied
the Ohio statute of limitations.
The latter case of Pan Energy established that it is now the
Utah

Statute

of

Limitations

that

are

applicable

to

foreign

judgments and orders. Therefore, Logan would not be applicable to
Noakes.
Although the Court in Logan also cited the Utah Code as to
statute of limitations, and observed that in Utah the action would
not have been barred (because it was brought within 8 years), the
Logan Court expressly found that the Ohio statutes applied to a
review of the Ohio Judgment, even in Utah. This is no longer the
law.
The trial Court in this instant matter, also cited to Seeley
v> Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975), and applied the eight year
statute of Limitations.

Seeley was a case which dealt with an

order issued from a Utah Order to Show Cause after registration,
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and did not deal with the registration of the foreign Decree.
There is no question that in Utah - when a Decree of Divorce is
entered,

an

obligation

as

for

alimony

becomes

a

judgment

essentially when it becomes due and owing.
However, Defendant asserts that U.C.A. § 78-12-22 does not
apply because the alimony payments which were owing were not
rendered to judgment in Washington prior to registration, and were
not timely rendered to judgment in Utah. In point of fact, Utah
does not know whether or not they were rendered to judgment in
Washington, because that was never raised or litigated.

If

Washington does not have an exact statute (similar to the defect in
the Logan case), then they never were judgments, and only the
payments which became due and owing after the Utah registration,
might even become judgments.
The foreign Decree must be examined in a different light than
that asserted by the Plaintiff. Accepting Plaintiff7s position,
once Plaintiff is deemed to have filed the Foreign Decree, the
following alimony obligations became (at the filing) a judgment,
because they essentially became judgments each month they were due.
Seeley found that;
(because) "the defendant had not paid all of the installments
for alimony and support as ordered by the decree of divorce.
The question was raised as to whether the statute of
limitation applied. This court held that it did and stated,
"Exception therefore may issue for the arrearages accumulated
within a period of eight years." [citing to Qpenshaw v.
Openshaw 105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943),]
The distinction of Seeley from this instant case can be found
by examination and application of the Pan Energy case. In Pan
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Energy, the Supreme Court (referring to the case of Stanford v.
Utley. 341 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1965)), stated as follows;
In Stanford, Judge (now Justice) Blackmun wrote: "We feel
that registration provides, so far as enforcement is
concerned, the equivalent of a new judgment of the
registration court." 341 F.2d at 268. Stanford was a diversity
case in which the court looked to the law of Missouri, the
state where the judgment had been registered, for the
applicable statute of limitations. Although the judgment was
unenforceable in Mississippi, the state where rendered, the
court allowed enforcement of the judgment because the Missouri
statute of limitations had not yet expired. 341 F.2d at 268.
Therefore, under application of this case law, the postregistration monthly alimony obligations of Defendant

(if the

Decree had been properly filed) would be "new" in Utah.

However,

the old alimony obligations were only "liabilities" because of the
examination of the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme
Court as to the issue of statute of limitations.
The application of the statute of limitations - as set forth
in U.C.A. § 78-12-29 requires that Defendant's alimony obligation
in Washington be considered only "liability" in Utah because if it
was not - it would be in conflict with Utah's enforcement doctrine
- as established in Pan Energy.

That is because if a judgment

opportunity dies under the statute of limitations which has expired
in the original state of jurisdiction - is capable of resurrection
or extension in Utah, due to retroactive application of Utah's
broader code, then essentially only one state's statute will
effectively bar enforcement — the state with the longest statute - forum shopping at it's ugliest.
Further, it could not be that the new jurisdictional state
21

could also apply the notion that once a foreign matter is rendered
to judgment

(as in Seeley) the longer eight year statute is

applicable.
The longer (8-year) statute of limitations should not be
applicable to alimony awards made in a Decree domesticated in Utah,
where the arrearages were only a "liability" and not yet reduced to
judgment.
correct

Especially where such judgment would be bared if the

statute

Stanford, Judge

of

limitations

would

have

been

applied.

(now Justice) Blackmun wrote: "We

In

feel that

registration provides, so far as enforcement is concerned, the
equivalent of a new judgment of the registration court," 341 F.2d
at 268.
The state of Utah may certainly enforce a valid Judgment from
another state, and may be empowered in some few cases, to resurrect
previously dead judgment's which have expired under the original
state's statutes, but this Court cannot set a policy whereby the
foreign Court can enter a Judgment which could not have been
entered in the original state —

cannot create a new basis for

judgment that never existed as a basis in the original state.
The state of Utah can also act to automatically render to
judgment future payments as they become due — but it cannot assume
a fact not before the Court; cannot retroactively apply Utah Code
to a Decree that was not registered until 1995 in Utah, unless the
requested amounts had already been rendered to judgment at or
before the time it was filed in Utah.
For the Court to be able to do such a thing - by policy - to
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existed under the jurisdiction at the time of the Decree, would
create potential chaos for future litigants —

and support clear

forum shopping.
Suppose a party had a Washington Decree granted in 1975 that
allowed (by statute) the Plaintiff to collect a $50.00 fine for
every day that the Defendant was one day late on alimony. Then
later (in 1980) the state of Washington repealed, as to all prior
and future Decrees, the statute that allowed such a sanction. The
Plaintiff would have been unable to collect the sanction in the
state of Washington, at least from 1980 on.
Then suppose that subsequently, Utah's legislature adopted the
same penalty statute, in 1995. Under the application of the law as
the Trial Court and Appellee would have it, the hypothetical
Plaintiff could then move to Utah and file the foreign Decree and
then ask not only for the ongoing late charges (because it would be
enforceable in Utah), but could also request past due fines for
every day the Defendant was late for the eight years preceding 1995
that were previously eliminated in the foreign state.
In this instant case, Defendant, Mr. Noakes, relied upon the
application of Washington law —

indeed, both parties lived by the

Washington

—

state

of

the

law

neither

collection of the alimony arrearages.

paying

nor

seeking

Then, the Plaintiff, Mrs.

Noakes, in retaliation for the visitation matters being addressed,
sought enforcement and resurrection of the Washington support
arrearanges, by counterclaiming in Utah.
Utah law clearly applies to the Decree as though it were a
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"new" judgment, as for the issue of prospective requests. However,
there was no information before the court which would enable the
court to know whether or not the alimony payments could have been
rendered to "judgment" in Washington, as was required by U.C.A.§
78-12-22.
Simply put, the trial court in Noakes was not enforcing a
"judgment" from the state of Washington. The trial court looked at
a foreign Decree and applied Utah law to reach back to a point in
time when Utah Courts had no jurisdiction over the parties' or the
subject matter.
The trial court could not have applied U.C.A. § 78-12-22,
because it had no information that the past due payments had ever
been rendered to judgment in Washington state; and for this court
to render them to judgment would have been like "retroactive"
filing of the foreign decree, not a registration of a "new" decree
as is set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Stanford.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES
The trial court could not have awarded attorney's fees to
Plaintiff, if it did not have the jurisdiction to issue the
judgment as to alimony. In as much as the Defendant prevailed on
his visitation matters, the fees were at worst a wash.
The Appellate Court typically reviews a trial court's award of
attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion:
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his visitation matters, the fees were at worst a wash.
The Appellate Court typically reviews a trial court's award of
attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion:
The decision to make such an award and
the amount thereof rest primarily in the
sound discretion of the trial court."
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991).
In addition the Court in Bell ruled:
[in order] to permit meaningful review of
the trial court's discretionary ruling,
we have consistently encouraged trial courts
to make findings to explain the factors which
they considered relevant in arriving at an
attorney fee award.'" Id. at 494.

The trial court did not make sufficient Findings to support
the award of attorney's fees. It is simply insufficient to say that
it was appropriate in a case to enforce an "order of alimony".
The Court did not even issue any Findings regarding the
financial need of the requesting party, and no evidence was placed
into the record in that regard.
Further, the Utah Court of Appeals has consistently reversed
or remanded any final order unsupported by adequate findings of
fact.

CONCLUSION

The award of alimony for a time when the Court did not have
jurisdiction

over

the

parties

or

the

subject

matter

was

inappropriate.
The trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations, as
25

to the issue of alimony.
The award of attorney's fees was not supported by the findings
of the court.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

5

day of June, 1997

•AKJELOC
JLAKELC

:torney for

Defenftafvt-Appellant
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APPENDIX "A'
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Fourth Judicial District Court of
u
^Cowfy, State of Utah.
ABswnrH
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T ,
. Clerk
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
V-/V^-ff rj_c^
DQ^
Janine Ray NOAKES, nka LINDSAY;
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

944402466

vs.

DATE:

November 15, 1996

Charles Leroy NOAKES,

JUDGE: HOWARD H. MAETANI
Defendant.

This matter came before the court on October 1, 1996. Plaintiff Janine Ray Noakes, nka
Lindsay was present and represented by counsel Brent D. Young. Defendant Charles Leroy
Noakes was present and represented by counsel Rosemond Blakelock. The Court granted
Plaintiff 15 days to submit an affidavit for attorney fees. Plaintiff was allowed 15 days to
submit objections to the Trial Memorandum submitted by defendant. Defendant was allowed
an additional five days to respond to Plaintiffs objection, and Plaintiff was given an
additional five days to respond. The Court also granted Defendant 15 days to submit proof of
alimony payments made in 1993, including agreement made with Plaintiffs counsel to pay
attorney fees in 1992.
Plaintiff submitted Affidavit for Attorney Fees on October 4, 1996. Defendant submitted
a Response to Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum with a Notice to Submit on October 21, 1996.
Defendant failed to submit any proof of alimony payments.
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits and arguments
of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents and being fully advised in the premises now
makes the following:
MEMORANDUM DECISION

A. Findings of Fact
1.

The parties were married on May 9, 1975 in Los Angeles, California.

2.

The parties obtained a Decree of Dissolution from the Superior Court, State of

Washington, King County, on or about June 13, 1991.
3.

On or about October 18, 1994, Defendant registered the foreign judgment entitled

Decree of Dissolution under the Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. §78-22a-l (1953).
4.

On June 5, 1995, defendant petitioned the court to modify the Decree regarding the

issues of visitation, custody, transportation costs and attorney's fees.
5.

On April 16, 1996, Plaintiff filed an Amended Counterclaim to enforce the support

order contained in the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff asserts that
defendant is delinquent in spousal support payments in the amount of $37,000. See Plaintiffs
Amended Counterclaim ^ 6.
6.

The court heard oral arguments on October 1, 1996. The remaining unsettled

issues were alimony and visitation rights of the defendant. The Court will not address the
issue of visitation until the parties have completed mediation. The Court will address the
remaining issue of alimony.
B. Issues
Plaintiff argues that the court has jurisdiction over the matter of alimony under the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-22a-l-3 (1953). Plaintiff asks that the
Decree be enforced and that defendant be ordered to pay delinquent alimony. Defendant
claims that Plaintiff is not entitled to ask for alimony arrearages because plaintiff failed to
follow the procedure for foreign judgments under U.C.A. §78-12-29 (1953).
Defendant claims that plaintiff failed to reduce the alimony to a judgment. Defendant
argues that plaintiff is now precluded from asking for the delinquent alimony because plaintiff

failed to request a judgment before the one year statute of limitations expired for such actions
under U.C.A. §78-22-29 (1953). Defendant claims that his alimony liability expired
September 1, 1996.
C. Analysis
Jurisdiction
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act specifies the procedure to be used when registering a
foreign judgment in Utah. The Act defines a foreign judgment as "any judgment, decree, or
order of a court of the United States or of any other court whose acts are entitled to full faith
and credit in this state." Utah Code Annotated §78-22a-2(l) (1953). Once a foreign
judgment is filed under the Act, it is given the same treatment and consideration as "a
judgment of a district court of this state." Utah Code Annotated §78-22a-2-(3) (1953). By
registering the Decree of Dissolution with the state under the Foreign Judgment Act in 1994,
Defendant brought the Decree under the jurisdiction of Utah.
The Decree of Dissolution is comprised of three documents: 1) the Decree of Dissolution;
2) the Permanent Parenting Plan; and 3) the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement.
The Decree of Dissolution states that ,f[t]he property and liabilities are distributed as set forth
in the Separation Agreement which is incorporated herein as if fully set forth." See Decree 6F
Dissolution, pg. 2, lines 11-13. The Parenting Plan is referred to in similar language earlier in
the document. See Decree of Dissolution, pg. 1, lines 20-22. The plain language of the
document implies that by domesticating the Decree of Dissolution, all the documents are
domesticated, thereby giving the court jurisdiction under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act to
enforce the agreement. By domesticating the Decree of Dissolution in October, 1994,
defendant domesticated all three documents comprising the Decree. As a result, plaintiff may
go forward with her Amended Counterclaim.

Alimony Arrearages
Defendant argues that plaintiff is precluded from asking for alimony arrearages because
§78-12-29 specifies a one year statue of limitations.

Defendant claims that plaintiff should

have asked for a judgment for the arrearages before September 1, 1996. See Response to
Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum at pg. 6.
The Court does not find defendant's argument compelling. The argument fails because the
appropriate statue to apply to the case at hand is U.C.A. §78-12-22 (1953) which states:
Within eight years:
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of any state or
territory within the United States.
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide support of
maintenance for dependent children.
In Seelev v. Park. 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme court ruled that the eight
year statute of limitations applies to alimony arrearages. In Logan v. Schrieder. 609 P.2d 943
(Utah 1980) the court determined that an Utah action brought in 1978 to enforce a 1975 Ohio
action for support arrearages was filed under this section in a timely manner. The current
plaintiff filed her action for alimony arrearages on or about April 17, 1996 in an Amended
Counterclaim. The arrearages date from October, 1990, to September, 1995, well within the
eight year limitation specified in U.C.A. §78-12-22.
The Separation and Property Settlement, dated November 16, 1990, obligated the
Defendant to pay the following maintenance payments:
$1000.00 per month from October 25, 1990, due and payable on the 26th day
of each month to be paid until August 1992.
$800.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1992 through
September 1, 1993.
$1050.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1993 through
September 1, 1994.
$400.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1994 through

September 1, 1995.
This arrearage amounts to $30,486.30 including interest. See Affidavit in Support of
Mot. To Dismiss Petition to Modify: Custody, Visitation, Child Support, at Exhibit A.
Defendant claims he made some payments which were not credited by Plaintiff. During oral
arguments on October 1, 1996, Defendant was given 15 days to submit evidence of these
payments. Defendant failed to submit any evidence of payments. Therefore, the amount in
arrears remains uncontested.
Attorney Fees
Under U.C.A. §30-3-3 (1953), the court may award attorney fees and court costs "in any
action to enforce an order of ...alimony...in a domestic case." In determining the
appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees the Court considers the following factors
specified in Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984); cited in Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417
(Utah 1986), and in Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987):
a. necessity of the number of hours dedicated by the attorney;
b. reasonableness of the rate charged;
c. rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community; and
d. financial need of the requesting party.
Plaintiff had to defend the case, which was originally a petition for custody. Visitation
and delinquent alimony were later added to the case.

Plaintiff prevailed on the issues of

custody and alimony. Plaintiffs attorney charged fees totaling $3,756.50 plus $130.00 court
costs.
The Court finds the attorney's fees and costs incurred by plaintiff in this action to be fair,
reasonable, and necessary given the complexity of the case, the fees customarily charged for
similar services in the community, the experience and expertise of counsel, and the type and

quality of work involved in this matter.
D. DECISION
1.

The court hereby exercises jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of

this action.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for alimony arrearages in the amount of $30,486.30

plus interest at the statutory rate.
3

Since neither party has submitted Financial Declarations declaring need or

obligations, the court will focus on the prevailing party to determine the award of attorney's
fees. Therefore, plaintiff is awarded court costs in the amount of $130.00 and attorney fees in
the amount of $3,000.00.
4.

Counsel for Plaintiff Janine Ray Noakes, nka Lindsay, is directed to prepare on

Order consistent with the above Memorandum Decision and submit it to the Court for
signature.
DATED at Provo, Utah this

/

day of November, 1996.

HOWA
ETANI
Fourth District Court Judge
cc:

Brent D. Young
Rosemond Blakelock

APPENDIX "B"
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT

BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
[VIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANINE RAY NOAKES, nka
LINDSAY,
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.
944402466
Judge: Howard Maetani

CHARLES LEROY NOAKES,
Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, all parties are
hereby notified that on the 8th day of January, 1997, judgment in the above-entitled
matter was entered by the Court, (signed on 6 January, 1997) a full, true and correct copy
of which is herewith served upon you. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
Order).
Dated this /o_ day of January, 1997.

BRENT D. YQ0NG'

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing on the
day of January, 1997, to Rose Blakelock, Attorney for Defendant, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
Rose Blakelock
Attorney at Law
37 E. Center, 2nd floor
Provo, UT 84606
BRENT D. YOUNG7
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BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVTE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah. 84603
Telephone: (801)375-3000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANTNE RAY NOAKES, nka
LINDSAY,
Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(HEARING DATE 1 OCTOBER, 1996)
Civil No. 944402466
Judge: Howard Maetani

CHARLES LEROY NOAKES,
Defendant.
This matter came before the court on October 1, 1996. Plaintiff Janine Ray
Noakes, nka Lindsay was present and represented by counsel Brent D. Young. Defendant
Charles Leroy Noakes was present and represented by counsel Rosemond Blakelock.
The Court granted plaintiff 15 days to submit an affidavit for attorney fees. Plaintiff was
allowed 15 days to submit objections to the Trial Memorandum submitted by defendant.
Defendant was allowed an additional five days to respond to Plaintiffs objection, and"
plaintiff was given an additional five days to respond. The court also granted defendant
15 days to submit proof of alimony payments made in 1993, including agreement made

with plaintiffs counsel to pay attorney fees in 1992.
Plaintiff submitted Affidavit for Attorney Fees on October 4, 1996. Defendant
submitted a Response to Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum with a Notice to Submit on
October 21, 1996. Defendant failed to submit any proof of alimony payments.
The court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits and
arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents and being fully advised in the
premises now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties were married on May 9, 1975 in Los Angeles, California.
2. The court finds the parties obtained a Decree of Dissolution from the Superior
Court, State of Washington, King County, on or about June 13, 1991.
3. The court finds on or about October 18, 1994, Defendant registered the foreign
judgment entitled Decree of Dissolution under the Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. §7822a-l (1953).
4. The court finds on June 5, 1995, defendant petitioned the court to modify the
Decree regarding the issues of visitation, custody, transportation costs and attorney's fees.
5. The court finds on April 16, 1996, Plaintiff filed an Amended Counterclain^to^
enforce the support order contained in the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement

2

Plaintiff asserts that defendant is delinquent in spousal support payments in the amount of
$37,000. See Plaintiffs Amended Counterclaim paragraph 6.
6. The court heard oral arguments on October 1, 1996. The remaining unsettled
issues were alimony and visitation rights of the defendant. The court will not address the
issue of visitation until the parties have completed mediation. The court will address the
remaining issue of alimony.
ISSUES
7. Plaintiff argued that the court has jurisdiction over the matter of alimony under
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-22a-l-3 (1953). Plaintiff asks
that the Decree be enforced and that defendant be ordered to pay delinquent alimony.
Defendant claims that plaintiff is not entitled to ask for alimony arrearage because
plaintiff failed to follow the procedure for foreign judgments under U.C.A. §78-12-29
(1953).
8. Defendant claims that plaintiff failed to reduce the alimony to a judgment.
Defendant argues that plaintiff is now precluded from asking for the delinquent alimony
because plaintiff failed to request a judgment before the one year statute of limitations
expired for such actions under U.C.A. §78-22-29 (1953). Defendant claims that Ms
alimony liability expired September 1, 1996.

3

ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction
9. The court finds the Utah Foreign Judgment Act specifies the procedure to be
used when registering a foreign judgment in Utah. The Act defines a foreign judgment as
"any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court
whose acts are entitled to full faith and credit in this state." Utah Code Annotated §7822a-2(l) (1953). Once a foreign judgment is filed under the Act, it is given the same
treatment and consideration as "a judgment of a district court of this state." Utah Code
Annotated §78-22a-2-(3) (1953). By registering the Decree of Dissolution with the state
under the Foreign Judgment Act in 1994, Defendant brought the Decree under the
jurisdiction of Utah.
10. The Decree of Dissolution is comprised of three documents: 1) the Decree of
Dissolution, 2) the Permanent Parenting Plan; and 3) the Separation and Property
Settlement Agreement. The Decree of Dissolution states that "[t]he property and
liabilities are distributed as set forth in the Separation Agreement which is incorporated
herein as if fully set forth." See Decree of Dissolution, pg. 2, lines 11-13. The Parenting
Plan is referred to in similar language earlier in the document. See Decree of Dissolution?
pg. 1, lines 20-22. The plain language of the document implies that by domesticating the
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Decree of Dissolution, all the documents are domesticated, thereby giving the court
jurisdiction under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act to enforce the agreement. By
domesticating the Decree of Dissolution in October, 1994, defendant domesticated all
three documents comprising the Decree. As a result, plaintiff may go forward with her
Amended Counterclaim.
ALIMONY ARREARAGE
11. Defendant argues that plaintiff is precluded from asking for alimony arrearage
because §78-12-29 specifies a one year statue of limitations. Defendant claims that
plaintiff should have asked for a judgment for the arrearage before September 1, 1996.
See Response to Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum at pg. 6.
12. The Court does not find defendant's argument compelling. The argument fails
because the appropriate statue to apply to the case at hand is U.C.A. §78-12-22 (1953)
which states:
Within eight years:
An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of
any state or territory within the United States.
An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to
provide support of maintenance for dependent children.
In Seelev v. Park. 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court ruled-that
the eight year statute of limitations applies to alimony arrearage. In Logan v. Schrieder,
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609 P.2d 943 (Utah 1980) the court determined that an Utah action brought in 1978 to
enforce a 1975 Ohio action for support arrearage was filed under this section in a timely
manner. The current plaintiff filed her action for alimony arrearage on or about April 17,
1996 in an Amended Counterclaim. The arrearage date from October, 1990, to
September, 1995, well within the eight year limitation specified in U.C.A. §78-12-22.
13. The court finds the Separation and Property Settlement, dated November 16,
1990, obligated the Defendant to pay the following maintenance payments:
$1000.00 per month from October 25, 1990, due and payable on the 26th
day of each month to be paid until August 1992.
$800.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1992 through
September 1, 1993.
$1050.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1993 through
September 1, 1994.
$400.00 per month due and payable from September 1, 1994 through
September 1, 1995.
14. The court finds this arrearage amounts to $30,486.30 including interest. See
Affidavit in Support of Motion To Dismiss Petition to Modify: Custody, Visitation, Child
Support, at Exhibit A. Defendant claims he made some payments which were not
credited by Plaintiff. During oral arguments on October 1, 1996, Defendant was given. 15.
days to submit evidence of these payments. Defendant failed to submit any evidence of
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payments. Therefore, the amount in arrears remains uncontested.
Attorney Fees
15. The court finds under U.C.A. §30-3-3 (1953), the court may award attorney
fees and court costs "in any action to enforce an order of... alimony ... in a domestic
case." In determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees the court
considers the following factors specified in Beals v. Beals. 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984);
cited in Huck v. Huck 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986), and in Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 85
(Utah App. 1987):
a. necessity of the number of hours dedicated by the attorney;
b. reasonableness of the rate charged;
c. rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community; and
d. financial need of the requesting party.
16. The court finds plaintiff had to defend the case, which was originally a
petition for custody. Visitation and delinquent alimony were later added to the case.
Plaintiff prevailed on the issues of custody and alimony. Plaintiffs attorney charged fees
totaling $3,756.50 plus $130.00 court costs.
17. The court finds the attorney's fees and costs incurred by plaintiff in this action^
to be fair, reasonable, and necessary given the complexity of the case, the fees
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customarily charged for similar services in the community, the experience and expertise
of counsel, and the type and quality of work involved in this matter.
18. The court finds it shall exercise jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of this action.
19. The court finds plaintiff shall be awarded a judgment for alimony arrearage in
the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX DOLLARS and
30/100 ($30,486.30), plus interest at the statutory rate.
20. The court finds since neither party has submitted Financial Declarations
declaring need or obligations, the court shall focus on the prevailing party to determine
the award of attorneys fees. Therefore, plaintiff shall be awarded court costs in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS ($130.00) and attorney fees in the
amount of THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($3,000.00).
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1) That the court exercises jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
this action;
(2) That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant for alimony
arrearage in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX and
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30/100 ($30,486.30), plus interest at the statutory rate;
(3) That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant for court costs in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS (S 130.00) and for attorney's fees in
the amount of THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS (53,000.00).
Dated this L? day^f

^ltisiA_

, 199_{7\

(ftUZ£>£a*i:
HOWARD H. MAETANI

Approved as to form:

%

hi
ROSE BLAKELOCK
Attorney for Defendant
COUR''

RACOMMON\HEATHER\LNDSYJOF«
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My

APPENDIX "D"
ORDER

BRENT D. YOUNG (3584)
IVTE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah, 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANINE RAY NOAKES, nka
LINDSAY,

I
ORDER (HEARING DATE 1
OCTOBER, 1996)

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 944402466
Judge: Howard Maetani

CHARLES LEROY NOAKES,
Defendant.

|

This matter came before the court on October 1, 1996. Plaintiff Janine Ray
Noakes, nka Lindsay was present and represented by counsel Brent D. Young. Defendant
Charles Leroy Noakes was present and represented by counsel Rosemond Blakelock.
The Court granted plaintiff 15 days to submit an affidavit for attorney fees. Plaintiff was
allowed 15 days to submit objections to the Trial Memorandum submitted by defendant.
Defendant was allowed an additional five days to respond to Plaintiffs objection,- and
plaintiff was given an additional five days to respond. The court also granted defendant
15 days to submit proof of alimony payments made in 1993, including agreement made

with plaintiffs counsel to pay attorney fees in 1992.
Plaintiff submitted Affidavit for Attorney Fees on October 4, 1996. Defendant
submitted a Response to Plaintiffs Trial Memorandum with a Notice to Submit on
October 21, 1996. Defendant failed to submit any proof of alimony payments.
The court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits and
arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents, being fully advised in the
premises, and based upon the accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
now makes the following:
ORDER
. 1. The court exercises jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
action.
2. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant for alimony arrearage in the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX and 30/100
($30,486.30), plus interest at the statutory rate.
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant for court costs in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS (S130.00) and for attorney's fees in the
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amount of THREE
IEE THOUSAND DOI
DOLLARS ($3,000.00).
Dated this
L day
day / / ^ J)rCM^,
199_
lis £p_
J j
COURT:

/nw^o^-£.' (Piajt&»LL
Vj*7T'f+-<>*yML. MAETANI
Approved as to form:

ROSE BLAKELOCK
Attorney for Defendant
H:\COMMON\HEATHER\LNDSY.ORDa
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